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Regulatory De-Arbitrage in Twenty-First Century
Cures Act's Health Information Regulation
CraigKonnoth *
INTRODUCTION

Health data regulation can be thought of at two levels. First, the microlevel of regulation has to do with Electronic Health Records (EHRs). Second,
the macro-level concerns the networks on which EHRs are transmitted. The
micro- and macro-levels of regulation interact. For example, EHRs need to
be configured so that they can be transmitted on mandated networks. As a
result, the lines do sometimes blur.
That said, the 21st Century Cures Act (Cures) clearly takes a dual
approach to regulation.' Cures was passed in December 2016 on a bipartisan
basis. 2 Its mandate was to address health data regulation at both the microand macro-levels.3 At the micro-level, Cures seeks to address the problem of
information blocking. It seeks to configure EHRs such that their users are
incentivized to share the information to the greatest degree possible. 4 As I
describe below, most penalties, however, apply only with respect to those
who participate in the voluntary EHR certification program of the Office of
the National Coordinator for Health Information Technology (ONC).5 At the
macro-level, Cures seeks to promote the creation of a national health
information network (NHIN).6 Like the certification program, participation
in the network is voluntary.
To the extent much of Cures' regulation relies on voluntary programs,
regulatory arbitrage is easy. Firms can just choose not to participate in more
* Craig Konnoth is an Associate Professor of Law at the University of Colorado Boulder
Law School.
1 21st Century Cures Act, Pub. L. No. 114-255, 130 Stat. 1033, 1033 (2016) (codified as
amended at 42 U.S.C. § 201 (2016)).
2 Robert Pear, Cures Act Gains Bipartisan Support That Eluded Obama Health Law, N.Y.
TiMEs (Dec. 8, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/12/08/us/politics/cures-act-healthcare-congress.html.
3 Id. (illustrating the difference in the size of Cures Act compared to the Affordable Care
Act, while stating both acts "affect every facet of medicine - from insurance coverage to
delivery of care").
4 See 21st Century Cures Act, Pub. L. No. 114-255, 130 Stat. 1033, 1176 (2016) (codified as
amended at 42 U.S.C. § 300jj-52 (2016)).
5 Id. at § 300jj-52(b).
6 See id. at § 300jj-19(a) (describing the process of awarding grants to entities to support the
collection of health information to be reported in accordance with this statute).
7 Id. at § 300jj- 19(c).
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robust regulation. However, in promulgating regulations, the Department of
Health and Human Services (HHS) has taken steps to incent providers and
other healthcare entities to participate both in the certification program and
in the national network." I conclude that while the incentives for participation
in the certification program will be effective, those for participating in the
national network are less so. I make recommendations to make such
participation highly desirable.
Part I offers a brief history of health data regulation. Part II offers an
overview of Cures. Part III explains Cures information blocking rules, and
the incentivized voluntary approach it has adopted there. Part IV explains
steps ONC has taken with respect to creating a national network, and the
shortcomings to the voluntary approach there. Part V offers a solution.
I.

THE HISTORY OF HEALTH DATA REGULATION

Health data regulation by Congress is now entering its second decade.
While President George W. Bush issued an Executive Order founding the
Office of the National Coordinator for Health Information Technology
(ONC-HIT) in 2004, 9 it was only in 2009 that Congress entered the fray,
passing the Health Information Technology for Economic and Clinical
Health (HITECH) Act, as part of the American Recovery and Reinvestment
Act.' 0 At the micro-level, HITECH focused on creating usable Electronic
Health Records (EHRs). " HHS, at HITECH's behest, developed a voluntary
certification program.' 2 ONC developed criteria that any EHR had to meet in
order to obtain ONC's imprimatur, or certification, that the EHRs was usable
in various ways.' 3 ONC largely devolved the task of certification to private
8 See Medicare and Medicaid Programs; Electronic Health Record Incentive Program -

Stage 3 and Modifications to Meaningful Use in 2015 Through 2017, 80 Fed. Reg. 62761,
62768 (Oct. 16, 2015) (to be codified at 42 C.F.R. pt. 412 and 495) (noting "Medicaid Eps
and eligible hospitals demonstrating meaningful use for the first time in the Medicaid EHR
Incentive Program would be required to attend for an her reporting period of any continuous
9-day period in the calendar year for purposes of receiving an incentive, as well as avoiding
the payment adjustment under the Medicare Program.").
9 See Nicolas Terry, MeaningfulAdoption: What We Know or Think We Know about the
Financing,Effectiveness, Quality, and Safety of ElectronicMedical Records, 34 J. LEGAL
MED. 7, 10 (2013) (explaining that the political history of EMRs began with President G.W.
Bush in 2004).
10 American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-5, 123 Stat. 115
(2009) (codified at 42 U.S.C. §201); See generally, Lucia Savage et al., DigitalHealth Data
and Information Sharing:A New Frontierfor Health Care Competition?, 82 ANTITRUST L. J.
593, 599 (2019) (explaining further that the passing of the HITECH Act provided over $36
billion in incentive payments for doctors and hospitals).
" See HIPAA Administrative Simplification; Enforcement, 74 Fed. Reg. 56123, 56124 (Oct.
30, 2009) (to be codified at 45 C.F.R. pt. 160) (stating "[t]he HITECH Act was incorporated
into ARRA to promote the adoption and meaningful use of health information technology.").
12See id. at 56130. (noting "HHS expects a covered entity's voluntary compliance .... ).
13See American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009, Pub, L. No. 111-5, 123 Stat. 115
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entities; 14 and in turn, published certification standards annually, subject to
notice and comment. 5 At the macro level, the Act provided nearly $36
billion to distribute to eligible providers in public insurance programs that
demonstrated "meaningful use" of EHR technology.' 6 Such standards
required providers to actually transmit data to other providers, clinical data
registries, and the like, with more granularity over time. 17 HITECH proved
effective at increasing uptake of EHRS.
Despite this success, HHS's data interchange regulations were limited.' 9
As a result, while participants could send certain clinical measures, few
providers could actually share EHRs in a meaningful way with other
20
providers or integrate EHRs received from others into their own systems.
Further, private entities lacked incentives to exchange health records, and
indeed, seek to block information interchange. 21 As a 2017 ONC Report
(2009) (codified at 42 U.S.C. §300jj-12) (providing specific areas for standardization,
implementation of specifications, and criteria for certification).
14

See generally OFFICE

OF THE NAT'L COORDINATOR FOR HEALTH INFO. TECH.,

Certification

FAQ's, HEALTHIT.GOv (Sept. 24, 2018), https://www.healthit.gov/topic/certificationehrs/certification-faqs (explaining that developers and venders wishing to certify must first
contact an ONC-Authorized Testing Laboratory to have their product tested, once tested and
deemed to satisfy applicable certification criteria, the developer or vender then contacts an
ONC-Authorized Certification bodies).
15 OFFICE OF THE NAT'L COORDINATOR FOR HEALTH INFO. TECH,

2015 Edition Health IT

Certification Criteria, HEALTHIT.GoV (Jan. 24, 2018)
https://www.healthit.gov/topic/certification-ehrs/2015-edition.
16 See

generally OFFICE OF THE NAT'L COORDINATOR

FOR HEALTH INFO. TECH,

Meaningful

Use andAL4CRA, HEALTHIT.GOV (Feb. 12, 2019)
https://www.healthit.gov/topic/meaningful-use-and-macra/meaningful-use-and-macra
(noting the current CMS program that encourages health IT adoption is the Medicare Access
and CHIP Reauthorization Act (MACRA)).
17See Medicare and Medicaid Programs; Electronic Health Record Incentive Program Stage 3 and Modifications to Meaningful Use in 2015 Through 2017, 80 Fed. Reg. 62761,
62818 (Oct. 16, 2015) (to be codified at 42 C.F.R. pt. 412 and 495) (requiring the reporting
of patients with a certain condition or all patients of a clinical or demographic group by
participating providers); See generally ClinicalQuality MeasuresBasics, CMS.Gov (Jun.
17,2019),https://www. cms.gov/RegulationsandGuidance/Legislation/EHRIncentiveProgram
s/ClinicalQualityMeasures.html (noting Medicare Promoting Interoperability Program
Requirements for 2019).
18 SHARONA HOFFMAN, ELECTRONIC HEALTH RECORDS AND MEDICAL BIG DATA 44
(Cambridge University Press, 2016); Julia Adler-Milstein & Ashish Jha, HITECHAct Drove
Large Gains in HospitalElectronic Health Record Adoption, 36 HEALTH AFF. 1416, 1420
(2017).
19 See, e.g., Hoffman, supra note 18, at 55; see also Savage et al., DigitalHealth
Data and Information Sharing:A New Frontierfor Health Care Competition?, 82
ANTITRUST L. J. 594, 612 (2019) (noting that "Congress has noticed that health

information is not flowing freely among health care providers.").
20 A. Jay Holmgren et al., Progressin Interoperability:Measuring US Hospitals'
Engagement in SharingPatientData, 36 HEALTH AFF. 1820, 1824-25 (2017).
21 OFFICE OF THE NAT'L COORDINATOR FOR HEALTH INFO. TECH., DEP'T OF HEALTH AND

1,16 (2015)
[hereinafter 2015 REPORT]; See Holmgren, supra note 20, at 1825-26 (explaining further
that progress toward interoperability has been slower than projected).
HUMAN SERVICES: 2015 REPORT TO CONGRESS ON INFORMATION BLOCKING,
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noted, health IT manufacturers, health information exchange organizations
(HIEs), hospitals, and even individual providers, engage in blocking "to
control referrals and enhance their market dominance. 2 2 Burdening the
ability to transmit information with another EHR, or enabling
communication with another HIE allows EHR companies and HIEs to fight
for market share, a "buy my product if you want to exchange information"
mentality. 23 Similarly, preventing transmission of an individual's data to
other providers will limit the ability of individuals to shop around for other
doctors. 24 Thus, as health IT expert Professor Julia Adler-Milstein testified
before the Senate, "EHR vendors do not have a business case for seamless,
affordable interoperability across vendor platforms, 2and
provider
5
organizations find it an expense that they often can't justify.
Blocking is quite prevalent and creates significant burdens on the health
system. Last February, for example, the Physician Clinical Registry
Coalition reported how specific EHR vendors, including EPIC, Allscripts,
Cemer and Athena, charged exorbitant fees, imposed technical barriers and
otherwise steered providers toward specific products through blocking. 26 As
a quantitative matter, an exhaustive 2016 study showed that hospitals which
used a specific regional market's dominant EHR vendor could engage in a
greater degree of health data exchange than those using the non-dominant
EHR.27 The authors concluded that "dominant vendors in competitive
markets may be least likely to facilitate HIE with other vendors. ''2s

See 2015 REPORT, supra note 21 at 16 (noting that healthcare providers have also been
accused of information blocking, a common charge being to control referrals and enhance
their market dominance).
23 See id. at 15 (explaining that most anecdotal evidence regarding information blocking is
directed at health IT developers charging fees that make sharing information cost-prohibitive
for
consumers and physicians).
24
Id. at 16.
22

25

America's Health IT Transformation: Translatingthe Promise of ElectronicHealth
Records Into Better Care: Hearing on Before the S. Comm. on Health, Education, Labor and
Pensions, (2015) (statement of Julia Adler-Milstein, Assistant Professor, Univ. of Mich.).
26 Letter from Physician Clinical Registry Coalition to James A. Cannatti, Senior Counselor

for Health Information Technology, Office of Inspector General, U.S. DEP'T HEALTH &
HUM. SERV., & Kathryn Marchesii, Chief Privacy Officer, Office of the National
Coordinator for Health Information Technology, U. S. DEP'T HEALTH & HUM. SERV., (Feb. 8,
2018), https://www.sts.org/sites/default/files/documents/0208 18-PCRC-Letter-InformationBlocking-EHR-Vendors.pdf; Joseph Conn, ONC fail: EHR 'data blocking' still rampant,
MOD. HEALTHCARE (Apr. 17, 2015, 1:00 AM),
https://www.modemhealthcare.com/article/20150417/NEWS/304179976/onc-fail-ehr-data-

blocking-still-rampant.
27 Jordan Everson & Julia Adler-Milstein, EngagementIn HospitalHealth Information
Exchange Is Associated With Vendor MarketplaceDominance, 35 HEALTH AFF. 1286, 1286
(2016).
21 Id. at 1292.
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II.

HEALTH INFORMATION REGULATION IN THE CURES ACT

Information blocking harmed health data regulation at both the microlevel by making EHRs harder to use and at the macro-level by making it
harder to create a national data network. Enter Cures. Section 4002 of Cures
prohibits developers of EHRs that participate in ONC's certification program
from taking "any action that constitutes information blocking., 29 Further, the
developer is prohibited from restricting users from communicating about
"the usability . . . interoperability . . . security," of the EHR, their
"experiences when using" the EHR, "the manner" of their use, and the
"business practices of developers."3 ° In a later less prominent, subsection,
Cures requires that Certified EHR technology (CEHRT) must also make
available information regarding "application programming interfaces"
(APIs).3 APIs are interfaces that could link with apps from, say, an iPhone,
allowing a user to download patient data from an EHR.3 2 This helps promote
data sharing.
Section 4002 works hand in glove with Section 4004, which prohibits
information blocking.33 Information blocking is defined as "a practice that ...
is likely to interfere with, prevent, or materially discourage access, exchange,
or use of electronic health information.' 3 If a developer engages in
information blocking or should know a practice may result in information
blocking, a constructive knowledge standard subjects the developer to
penalties.35 Providers must have actual knowledge to be held liable.3 6 Both
providers and developers are subject to penalties for blocking.3 7 Developers
face up to $1 million per violation; provider penalties are determined by
rulemaking.38 Finally, the statute permits blocking in some instances, the
determination of which is completely in the hands of HHS. 3 9
Lastly, Section 4003 seeks to develop a national network. It mandates that
ONC "shall convene appropriate public and private stakeholders to develop
or support a trusted exchange framework for trust policies and practices and
for a common agreement for exchange between health information
Genevieve Morris & Elise Sweeny Anthony, 21st Century CuresAct Overview for States,
7 (Jan. 8, 2018),
https://www.healthit.gov/sites/default/files/curesactleamingsession 1 v6 10 8 18 .pdf.
30
21st Century Cures Act, Pub. L. No. 114-255, §4002, 130 Stat. 1033, 1159-60 (2016).
31
Id.at 1160.
32THE OFFICE OF THE NAT'L. COORDINATOR FOR HEALTH INFO. TECH., ABOUT APIs, at 2,
https://www.healthit.gov/api-educationmodule/story-content/external -files/hhs -transcript module.pdf (last visited Nov. 24, 2019).
33 21st Century Cures Act § 4004, 130 Stat. at 1176.
34
Id. at 1176.
35 Morris & Sweeny Anthony, supra note 29, at 31-32.
36
1d. at 31.
37
Id. at 32.
38 21st Century Cures Act § 3022(B)(2)(A), 130 Stat. at 1178.
39 Morris & Sweeny Anthony, supra note 29, at 31.
29

OFFICE NAT'L COORDINATOR FOR HEALTH INFO. TECH., at
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This agreement will determine "a common method for

authenticating trusted health information network participants; ...
a common
set of rules [and] ...
organizational and operational policies ...and a process

for filing and
adjudicating noncompliance with the terms of the common
41
agreement.",

III.

MICRO-LEVEL RULES REGARDING EHRs

This Section provides an overview of the EHR regulation emerging from
Cures. It also explains how ONC provides incentives for entities to assume
more onerous regulation.
In laying on the requirements for EHRs, ONC engages in what I term
elsewhere "concentric regulation." By this, I mean that different sets of
regulatees are subject to an escalating set of requirements. First, at the outer
edge are providers. All providers and certified developers are subject to the
information blocking rules.42 Notably, although the statute permits HHS to
forbid any developer-not just certified developers-from engaging in
information blocking, the regulations do not reach that far. 43 These rules set
the minimum set of requirements, prohibiting providers from knowingly
engaging in behavior that is unreasonable and would "interfere with.., access,
exchange, or use of electronic health information., 44 Per the statute, ONC
set out a list of exceptions that permitted providers to withhold information.
These comprise: (1) "preventing harm"; (2) "promoting ... privacy"; (3)
"promoting .. . security"; (4) "recovering costs"; (5) situations where the
,requests ... are infeasible"; (6) "licensing of interoperability elements on

45
reasonable and non-discriminatory terms"; and (7) systems maintenance.
Preventing information blocking is, of course, the basic minimum required
to promote interoperability. The rule also takes affirmative steps to promote
interoperability and functionality.46 This second level requirement did not
apply universally-rather it applied only to a limited set of EHRs-so-called
Certified Electronic Health Record Technology
(CEHRT), and by extension,
47
to the limited set of providers that used it.
There are three features of the heightened set of CEHRT requirements that

40 21st Century Cures Act § 4033(b)(9)(B)(i), 130 Stat. at 1165.
41 Id. at 1165-66.
42 2 1st

Century Cures Act: Interoperability, Information Blocking, and the ONC Health IT
Certification Program, 84 Fed. Reg. 42, 7424 (Mar. 4, 2019) (to be codified at 45 C.F.R. pt.
170-71) [hereinafter 21st Century Cures Act].
43Id.
44
Id. (noting that CEHRT are subject to the same requirements but have a constructive
knowledge
standard).
45
Id. at 7602-05.
46

Id. at 7485.

47Id. at

7495 (noting that second level requirement does not technically apply to CEHRT
users certified only to a CDS functionality).

https://lawecommons.luc.edu/annals/vol29/iss1/4

6

Konnoth: Regulatory De-Arbitrage in Twenty-First Century Cures Act's Healt

Annals of Health Law and Life Sciences

2020

bear mentioning. First, there is greater functionality. CEHRT must comply
with a new data set developed by ONC in consultation with stakeholders. 48
This U.S. Core Data for Interoperability set (USCDI) was initially only used
as part of ONC's HITECH incentive program, but now, ONC hopes, will be
extended to all EHRs. 49 Finally, ONC proposes to heighten opioid
functionality in CEHRT, and issued a detailed set of explanations on that
front.50 Additionally, and relatedly, CEHRT will have to be able to provide
greater support for electronic prescribing than
before, including providing
51
information about risk mitigation strategies.
The second aspect of CEHRT certification sought to promote
interoperability. Per the statute, the rule required CEHRT developers to
provide assurances that they did not engage in information blocking, and did
not restrict the usability, interoperability, security, experiential, and business
practices related information, as the statute required. 52 This effectively
nullified so-called "gag clauses" that developers inserted into contracts with
providers, that prevented the latter from communicating problems about the
EHRs. 53 Finally, and perhaps most innovatively, the rule built on the glancing
reference on APIs in the statute. As the Act required, the rule provides that
"health information from such technology" must "be accessed, exchanged,
and used without special effort through the use of APIs or successor
technology or standards, as provided for under applicable law.",54 The Cures
Act's API Condition of Certification also states that a developer must,
through an API, "provide access to all data elements of a patient's electronic
health record to the extent permissible under applicable privacy laws., 55 At
the population level, the goal is to ultimately promote Clinical Decision
Support (CDS) to a greater degree than ever before, allowing a multitude
of
56
researchers to access and use the data in new and innovative ways.
The third set of requirements concerns assurances as to CEHRT
functionality. ONC promotes real world testing, requires developers to
publish testing plans, and the results of tests. 57 Indeed, ONC has requested
comments on the idea that CEHRT developers must participate in the national
Trusted Exchange Framework & Common Agreement (TEFCA) network in
order to prove that their product meets certification standards. 58 Further,
Id. at 7495.
Id. at 7439-40
50
Id. at 7461-65.
51 Id. at 7444-45.

48

49

5

2Id. at

13

54

7593.

Id. at 7476.
Id. at 7594.

55

Id. at 7476.
Id. at 7605.
17 Id. at 7496.
56

58 Id. at 7466.
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CEHRT developers must submit attestations that their products are up to
snuff every six months.5 9 ONC seeks to make compliance easy-indeed, if
a CEHRT developer cannot certify that they are in compliance, they can
indicate as much to ONC.6 ° ONC is willing to work with such a developer.6'
Further, customers can make complaints. They should first try to resolve the
complaint with the developer, then contact the private certification body.62
But if those steps do not work, they can go to ONC.63 If ONC does not find
the entity cooperative, ONC will take various steps including suspending, or
terminating certification of future, and if necessary, current, products, as well
as publicly shame the offender by listing them publicly. 64 ONC can also refer
and work in tandem with the OIG.65
These three sets of second level requirements are more onerous than
simply the information blocking requirements at the first level. At the same
time, they are voluntary-a developer might simply decline to obtain
certification. However, they are also highly desirable. The nation's health
system would greatly benefit from EHRs with a high degree of opioid related,
privacy supportive, functionality, that all use the same data sets, and that
support apps. How does ONC incent voluntary certification?
The structure of rules supports voluntary certification by imposing
information blocking liability on providers. While the statute provides that
providers are only liable if they knowingly engage in information blocking,
to ensure that they do not face liability or investigation, a rational provider is
more likely to seek EHRs that do not engage in information blocking. This,
by itself, might cause non-certified EHRs to comply with the EHR
information blocking requirements, even though the regulations do not
require them to do so. A non-certified EHR that continues to engage in
information blocking might soon find itself without a customer base.
But the more important point is-how is the provider to know whether an
EHR engages in information blocking or not? ONC and OIG have declined
to engage in any oversight of non-certified EHRs even though the statute
authorizes some such oversight.66 On the other hand, CEHRT publishes test
results, might participate in TEFCA, is subject to a complaint mechanism,
and provides attestations twice a year.67 The rules authorize OIG to
investigate only CEHRT developers (though the statute is written more

9Idat 7501.
1Id. at 7502
61 Id.
62 Id. at 7503.
63 Id at 7503.
64 Id. at 7504-06.
65 Id. at 7507.
6

66 Id. at 7502-07.

67 Id. at 7466, 7496, 7501, 7503.
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broadly).6" A rational provider would be more likely to pick a CEHRT that
is subject to these oversight mechanisms. The provider can investigate
certifications, complaint history, and past corrective actions to choose the
right EHR that would insulate themselves from future liability in any
situation in which information blocking occurs. This, in turn, incentivizes
EHRs to obtain certification-in order to obtain access to a larger customer
base.
In this way, ONC discourages regulatory arbitrage. A developer could
choose to forego certification-but ONC has arranged market conditions
such that that option would be undesirable. Thus, ONC has encouraged
voluntary adoption of higher requirements.
IV.

MACRO LEVEL REGULATION-TEFCA

Pursuant to the instructions in Cures, in January 2018, HHS published a
draft TEFCA.69 That draft was subject to commentary, and in April 2019,
TEFCA released another draft. 70 According to the most recent draft, "[tlhe
TEF and the Common Agreement will be distinct components that together
aim to create technical and legal requirements for sharing EHI [electronic
health information] at a nationwide scale across disparate HINs [health
information networks]. ' 7i As ONC explains, "[tlhe TEF describes a
common set of principles that facilitate trust between HINs.7 2 These
principles serve as 'rules of the road' for nationwide electronic health
information exchange. 73 ONC will develop the TEF.74 On the other hand,
"[tlhe Common Agreement will provide the governance necessary [for] a
functioning system of connected HINs .

.

. The architecture will follow a

'network of networks' structure, which allows for multiple points of entry
75
and is inclusive of many different types of health care entities.,
Nonetheless, as I suggest above, TEFCA's data management requirements,
both on the privacy and security front, are likely to be detailed and robust.
As with the previous draft, however, the national networks will be unified
under the supervision of "a single, industry-based [Recognized Coordinating
Entity (RCE)]. 7 6 This RCE will "onboard[] organizations to the final
68 Id. at 7507.
69 OFF. OF THE NAT'L COORDINATOR FOR HEALTH INFO. TECH., DRAFT TRUSTED EXCHANGE

FRAMwoRK (2018) [hereinafter DRAFT].
70 OFF. OF THE NAT'L COORDINATOR FOR HEALTH INFO. TECH., TRUSTED EXCHANGE

FRAMEwoRK AND COMMON AGREEMENT DRAFT 2
71

(2019)

[hereinafter DRAFT 2].

Id. at4.

72 Id.
73 Id.
74
75

Id.
Id.

supra note 69, at 30. Accordingly, I do not agree with the comment from the
American College of Surgeons that purports to find ambiguity in the term "industry-based",
76 DRAFT,
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TEFCA, ensur[e] Qualified [networks] comply with the terms and conditions
of the TEFCA, address[] non-conformities . . . , develop[] additional use

cases," and engage in "day-to-day management and oversight of unaffiliated
Qualified [health information networks].' 7 The RCE will itself have the
power to "update [e] the TEFCA over time ... ,78 Under the RCE will be 7

large entities who will each run regional qualified health information
networks (QHINs). 79
The TEF seeks to promote various methods of information interchange.
Targeted queries allow one QHIN to seek EHI from another specific QHIN.s°
A broadcast query allows the QHIN to query all other QHRNs. s' Finally, a
QHIN can also "push" data to another QHIN even if it is not in response to a
query.8 2 TEFCA provisions address "meaningful choice, written privacy
summaries, data integrity, identity proofing, access control, user
authentication, and auditing consistent with industry best practices," which
often exceed those required by existing law."3 The TEF critically mandates
"[c]ollaborat[ion] with stakeholders across the continuum of care to
exchange EHI, even when a stakeholder may be a business competitor. "4
This would preclude, for example, "throttling the speed with which data is
exchanged purely for competitive reasons, limiting the data elements that are
exchanged with healthcare organizations that may be their competitor or a
competitor of one of their participants, or by requiring burdensome testing
requirements designed to unfairly deter or discourage connections that do not
benefit the HIN"-all practices which entities have been known to engage in
with competitors."5 It seeks to promote access by other caregivers and even
exchange of population level data for research. 6
Participation in TEFCA is voluntary. 7 The requirements of TEFCA
exceed the requirements of existing regulation-for example, industry
standards of privacy and security may exceed those mandated by HIPAA and
as the language of TEFCA forecloses that interpretation); TEFCA COMMENTS, at 809
(arguing (The American College of Surgeons) that the term "is
broad and open to
interpretation"
and that it could be "aquasi-government entity").
77

1d. at9.
78 Id. (noting that additionally, instead of one firm, it would consider giving the contract to

an
organization created by a group of firms).
79
Id. at5.
8
oDRAFT2, supra note 70 at 13.
81Id.
82 Id.
83 Id. at
84

16.

Id.at 24.
85 Id. at 27; see also id.
at 47-48 (detailing Cooperation and Non-Discrimination sections).
86
Id.at 24.
87 Rebecca Pifer, Industry interoperabilityconcernsplague TEFCA draft, HEALTHCARE
DIVE (June 20, 2019), https://www.healthcaredive.com/news/industry-interoperabilityconcems-plague-tefca-draft/557208/.
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state regulation. 8 However, I believe it is fair to say that the additional
regulatory burden does not, at first, seem much greater than that already
imposed by current law on all healthcare entities.
However, the new TEFCA draft overlooks a set of comments from the
previous draft that explained that TEFCA would create regulatory burdens
because of the patchwork of state privacy laws.89 With one or two exceptions,
every commenter to address the issue, from states to private entities, has
rejected the approach that TEFCA currently takes, that varies applicable
privacy policy state by state. 90 As the Florida state agency notes, this would
lead to the precise fragmentation that TEFCA was meant to avoid. 91
Similarly, as the American Hospital Association notes, "it will be very
challenging, if not impossible to know whether responding to a specific
request is, in fact, allowed by applicable law," given the multiple laws across
the country. 9 2 Thus, commenters suggest they would not join the network if
they had to comply with a patchwork of state privacy law. 93
94
Thus, even as private industry celebrated TEFCA's voluntary approach,
others criticized it. As the Louisiana state exchange explained,
88 DRAFT, supra note 69, at 38 (describing crosswalk between NIST and HIPAA standards).
89 See generally DRAFT 2, supra note 70.

90 The author has a pdf binder of all comments submitted on TFCA. The
numbering reflects the Bates number on the pdf. TEFCA COMMENTS. "SHIEC
strongly encourages ONC to provide the industry with guidance on addressing
variation in state and federal laws related to privacy and consent. TEFCA is silent
on how to address this variation, other than to state that all applicable law must be
followed" and calling for "strong leadership to set a national approach." Id. at 684.
"While the trusted exchange fmmework highlights the importance of privacy and
consent as one of the core principles, the common agreement section of the
document seems to pay little specific attention to the reality of inconsistent state,
local and tribal patient consent and data sharing laws that are often an obstacle to
cross-jurisdiction interoperability." Id. at 951. "GNYHA seeks additional detail on
how ONC plans to harmonize varying state consent rules for health inforation
exchange (For example, while some states do not require separate patient consent
for exchanging patient inforation unless a patient opts out, others such as New
York State require a patient to opt-in to the exchange. How will this be
reconciled?), among others." Id. at 660.
91TEFCA COMMENTS, at 671 (stating "Variation in state law surrounding patient
authorization remains a significant barrier to exchange. In Florida, this results in a strict
inability to exchange with states who do not obtain explicit patient consent to exchange
sensitive data. Laws that reach beyond the HIPAA requirements create a landscape where
some states are virtual islands...").
92 Id. at 61; see also id. at 781 (providing an example: "an out-of-state HIE seeking to obtain

a patient's information from a New York State HIE would need to have that patient's
consent in hand in order to access that information ... even if the out-of-state HIE properly
followed its own states opt-out rules for consent").
9 Id. at 801.

9' Letter from Ashley Thompson, Sen. VP AHA, to Don Rucker M.D., Nat'l Coord. Health
Info. Tech., (June 17, 2019); TEFCA COMMENTS at 56 ("The AHA applauds ONC for
pursuing a voluntary 'network of networks' approach.
); Id. at 852 ("We also agree with
and appreciate the voluntary nature of the TEFCA.").
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Given that participation in the Trusted Exchange Framework is voluntary,
it is unclear how it will achieve the Cures' determination that satisfy (1)
complete access to health information without special effort; and (2) no
information blocking. If a provider, payer or other organization that holds
parts or the whole content of one's health information chooses not to
participate in the TEFCA, that in itself would limit complete access to
one's health information and may even constitute information blocking. 95
Indeed, certain groups emphasize their need for autonomy. 96 As the
American Medical Association, Connected Health, and others emphasized,
not only should the government not mandate connection, but insurers should
not be allowed to make providers join TEFCA as a condition of network
participation. 97
V.

POSSIBLE INCENTIVES FOR JOINING TEFCA

Could ONC incentivize joining TEFCA as it seeks to incentivize
participation in its certification program? I explain what the incentive should
be, the shape it should take, and the process for implementing it.
A.

Creatinga TEFCA Incentive

ONC might consider offering various incentives for joining TEFCA.
Rules that CMS developed in consultation with ONC might provide one set
of incentives. In those rules, CMS required private entities working under the
umbrella of Medicare and Medicaid (such as Medicare Advantage plans), as
well as payers on federally funded exchanges to create APIs that are
analogous to those required of CEHRT, to make data available for patients,
and to engage in certain kinds of data exchange activities.98 CMS proposes
that participation in TEFCA would satisfy some of these data exchange
activities.99 This incentive, however, is limited to only a small set of plans.
Another approach might simply be to provide subsidies to entities joining
TEFCA. Thus, as the Medical Group Management Association suggests,
ONC could "[c]reat[e] appropriate financial incentives.., including payment
incentives and payment for e-consultation or incentives for use of HIN

9' TEFCA COMMENTS supra note 90 at 395 (nursing professionals expressing similar

concerns).
96
Id.
97
1 d. at 133, 197.
98 Interoperability and Patient Access for Medicare Advantage Organization and Medicaid
Managed Care Plans, State Medicaid Agencies, CHIP Agencies and CHIP Managed Care
Entities, Issuers of Qualified Health Plans in the Federally Facilitated Exchanges and Health
Care Providers, 84 Fed. Reg. 7610, 7616 (proposed Mar. 4, 2019) (to be codified at 45
C.F.R. pt. 170) [hereinafter Interoperability and Patient Access].
99
Id. at 7618, 7642.

https://lawecommons.luc.edu/annals/vol29/iss1/4

12

Konnoth: Regulatory De-Arbitrage in Twenty-First Century Cures Act's Healt

2020

Annals of Health Law and Life Sciences

related services."'0 0 Given ONC's shrinking budget,' this approach is
unlikely.
A third approach is simply to take the bull by the horns, and address
potential participants' main concern-that is, the patchwork of state privacy
laws. Addressing the patchwork of state privacy laws may take two tacks.
First, agreements might incorporate the state privacy standards from all the
states as its minimum -that is, it would effectively adopt a policy that would
satisfy all state laws. But this option is impossible, as states have different
requirements based on different balances they have struck between privacy
and other values.0 2 Some states, like Maine, seek a freer flow of data, and
only require individuals to opt out of their data going onto an exchange.'0 3
Others, place a greater premium on privacy, and have an opt-in system, like
New York. 10 4 Yet others have different requirements depending on the kind
of data at issue. No policy can reconcile these tensions. Specifying the exact
swath of this preemption, and the kinds of state privacy laws that would be
preempted, is beyond the scope of this short Essay, and is discussed
elsewhere.'0 5
The second alternative is to write the agreements to promulgate their own
100 TEFCA COMMENTS supra note 90 at 976.
101See Heather Landi, ONC Budget Cut by 29 Percentin FY2019 DraftBill NIH Gets
$1.25B Boost, HEALTHCARE INNOVATION (June 19, 2018),
https://www.hcinnovationgroup.com/policy-value-based-care/news/13030445/onc-budgetcut-by-29-percent-in-fy2O19-draft-bill-nih-gets- 125b-boost.
102 See TEFCA COMMENTS supra note 90; Letter from Therasa Bell, President and Chief
Tech. Officer, Kno2, to Don Rucker, Nat'l Coordinator for Health Info. Tech., U.S. Dep't
Health & Hum. Servs. 5 (Feb. 20, 2018) (on file with author) (discussing the issues
surrounding the variation of privacy laws from state to state); see also Memorandum from
Charles Jaffe, Chief Exec. Officer, Health Level Seven Int'l, to Don Rucker, Nat'l
Coordinator for Health Info. Tech., U.S. Dep't Health & Hum. Servs. 6-7 (Feb. 20, 2018)
(on file with author) (commenting that there should be an overarching privacy policy such as
those specified by federal or state laws); see also Letter from Martin A. Lupinetti, President,
HealthShare Exchange, to Don Rucker, Nat'l Coordinator for Health Info. Tech., U.S. Dep't
Health & Hum. Servs. 1 (Feb. 20, 2018) (on file with author) (recommending the ONC to
"[flocus efforts on streamlining the conflicting state laws governing the privacy of data").
103 See TEFCA COMMENTS supra note 90; Letter from Shaun T. Alfreds, Exec. Dir. &
Acting CEO, HealthInfo Net, to Don Rucker, Nat'l Coordinator for Health Info. Tech., U.S.
Dep't Health & Hum. Servs. (Feb. 20, 2018) (on file with author) (commenting on the
Trusted Exchange Framework and Common Agreement Draft and the U.S. Core Data for
Interoperability Draft).
104 Memorandum from Valerie Gray, Exec. Dir., N.Y. e Health Collaborative (NYeC), to
Don Rucker, Nat'l Coordinator for Health Info. Tech., U.S. Dep't Health & Hum. Servs.
(Feb. 20, 2018) (on file with author) (commenting on the Trusted Exchange Framework and
Common Agreement Draft); See also Letter from Kenneth E. Raske, President, Greater N.Y.
Hosp. Ass'n, to Don Rucker, Nat'l Coordinator for Health Info. Tech., U.S. Dep't Health &
Hum. Servs. (Feb. 20, 2018) (on file with author) (commenting on the Trusted Exchange
Framework and Common Agreement Draft and the U.S. Core Data for Interoperability
Draft).
105 Craig Konnoth, Preemption Through Privatization (2019) (unpublished manuscript) (on
file with author).
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privacy policy, independent of state privacy law. This policy will trump state
privacy law. 0 6 As the Supreme Court has explained, state law is preempted
if it "stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full
purposes and objectives of Congress. '"107 In such cases, the Court first
identifies the purposes of the federal scheme, and second, determines the
extent to which the state law stands as an obstacle.'" State laws that exceed
or fall short of federal regulations of information-that is, laws that mandate
more or less information be exchanged, in ways that do not comply with the
federal scheme-clearly stand as an obstacle to a uniform health data
exchange system that the Cures Act seeks to mandate. 10 9

Commenters seem to have come to the same conclusion. For example, the
Mayo Clinic suggests the possibility that TEFCA could preempt a list of state
policies beyond privacy laws, and asks if "TEFCA policies and procedures
supersede ... state-based rules for patient consent, HIE accreditation, data
sharing requirements, research (IRB process), privacy reporting
requirements, etc.?"" 0 Others see it as a congressional command: since Cures
seeks to promote information interchange, private commenters seek "a
nationwide consent model" to replace the "different consent models at the
state level,""' "drafting a uniform set of laws and regulations," ' 1 2 and
adopting "a comprehensive approach to defining consent and authorization
laws/regulations ... for the TEFCA to be successful.""' 3
106 Amanda G. Lewis, FederalPreemptionof State andLocal Laws: State andLocal Efforts

to Impose Sanctions on Employers of UnauthorizedAliens 6 (May 5, 2008)
https://web.law.columbia.edu/sites/default/files/microsites/careerservices/Federal% 20Preemptiono20oft/o20 State0%20and0%20Local0%20Laws.pdf (explaining
that this so called "obstacle" preemption is one of several approaches... there is express
preemption, implied field preemption, and implied obstacle preemption, as here).
107 Freightliner Corp. v. Myrick, 514 U.S. 280, 287 (1995) (quoting Hines v. Davidowitz,
312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941)).
108 Lewis, supra note 106, at 6.
109 See Carolyn T. Lye et al., The 21st Century CuresAct and Electronic Health Records

One Year Later: Will PatientsSee the Benefits?, 25 J. AM. MED.

INFORMATICS Ass'N.

1218,

1219-20 (2018) ("The goal is improved nationwide health information exchange and
improved patient access to their health information.").
110 Letter from Wyatt W. Decker & Christopher J. Ross, Chief Med. Info. Officer & Chief
Info. Officer, Mayo Clinic, to Nat'l Coordinator for Health Info. Tech., U.S. Dep't Health &
Hum. Servs. (Feb. 20, 2018) (on file with author) (commenting on the Trusted Exchange
Framework and Common Agreement Draft, U.S. Core Data for Interoperability Draft, and
Proposed Expansion Process).
...Id. at 1041; see also Memorandum from Charles Jaffe, supra note 102, at 5
(recommending that the agency "[e]ncourage states to harmonize privacy legislation").
112 Letter from Wyatt W. Decker, supra note 110 at 1023; see also Letter from Martin A.
Lupinetti, supra note 102, at 1-2 (recommending that the Office of the National Coordinator
for Health Information work to "[e]stablish a national standard for Qualified Health
Information Network (QHIN) that includes clear requirements for privacy and security and a
definition of QHIN that requires these entities to establish data sharing among a multitude of
covered entity and non-covered entity types.").
113 Letter from Paul Uhrig, Chief Administrative, Legal & Privacy Officer, Surescripts, to
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Creating a regime that allows private entities to escape conflicting state
laws concerning health information networks would greatly incentivize
entities to join the network. In this way, ONC could finally achieve a truly
national health information network.
B. The Shape and Process of the PreemptionIncentive
What laws exactly would TEFCA preempt? The statute requires "a
common agreement among health information networks nationally." 11 4 At a
minimum, differing consent standards for transmitting information on health
networks-such as Maine's. 5 and New York's"16 -would go, and be
replaced by one standard. But TEFCA could be written to preempt a broader
set of privacy laws.117 For example, HIPAA permits sale of protected data
for research with an authorization," 8 some state laws, such as Texas's Bill
300, do not do so." 9 If TEFCA's drafters (reasonably) disagree with Texas's
approach, they could conceivably override it with respect to data transmitted

Don Rucker, Nat'l Coordinator for Health Info. Tech., U.S. Dep't Health & Hum. Sews. 6, 8
(Feb. 20, 2018) (on file with author) (commenting in detail on the ONC Trusted Exchange
Framework and U.S. Core Data for Interoperability Drafts). Further, "local governance
[including privately negotiated agreements, one assumes] over data use is eliminated by the
Common Agreement," Letter from Melissa A. Kotrys, Chief Exec. Officer, Health Current,
to Don Rucker, Nat'l Coordinator for Health Info. Tech., U.S. Dep't Health & Hum. Servs. 2
(Feb. 20, 2018) (on file with author). The Ohio entity, which is a public private partnership,
similarly asks: "would this mean that payers at the national level would have the right to preempt local or state contracts with HINs[?]", Letter from Dan Paoletti, Chief Exec. Officer,
Ohio Health Info Partnership, to Don Rucker, Nat'l Coordinator for Health Info. Tech., U.S.
Dep't Health & Hum. Sews. 4 (Feb. 16, 2018) (on file with author). Some entities suggestsomewhat disingenuously to my mind-that the states and federal government will come to
some agreement on privacy laws, Id. at 123.
114 Office of the National Coordinator for Health Information Technology, 42 U.S.C. §
300jj-11(9)(A) (2016).
115 Letter from Shaun T. Alfreds, supranote 103, at 1.
116 Memorandum from Valerie Gray, supra note 104, at 2.
117 See Letter from Sean Turner & Clara Evans, Senior Dir. & Dir., Dignity Health,
to Don Rucker, Nat'l Coordinator for Health Info. Tech., U.S. Dep't Health &
Hum. Servs. 4-5 (Feb. 20, 2018) (on file with author) (commenting that "the ONC
should specify that all entities participating in the TEFCA will abide by the
requirements of HIPAA, whether they are HIPAA-covered entities or not.").
118 45 C.F.R. § 164.508(a)(4)(i) (2013); see also id. §164.508(a)(3) (noting that

marketing is subject to a different requirement); see also id. § 164.508(a)(3)(i)-(iii)
(stating that marketing requires a separate authorization which notifies whether
remuneration will be provided).
119

See TEx. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 181.153 (West 2015) (stating "[a] covered
entity may not disclose an individual's protected health information to any other person in
exchange for direct or indirect remuneration, except.., for treatment, payment, and
healthcare operations," a prohibition that cannot be waived with a patient's authorization);
see also id. at § 181.154 (providing a list of uses for which authorization is required; but
nothing in that provision's text leavens the flat prohibition in § 181.153. While there is, in
addition, a catchall provision in § 181.153 that allows release for uses permitted by federal
law, it is doubtful that the exception canbe read to follow the core text of § 181.153).
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on the network. 120
Other laws may remain intact. For example, both Texas and California law
set tighter deadlines for complying with requests for health data from patients
than HIPAA. 12 1 One might read the statutory language narrowly"agreement among health information networks' 122 may refer to data sharing
only within the network, that is among various nodes of the network. It would
not preempt rules regarding passing data from the network to external
consumers. A broad reading, however, would preempt such provisions.
Finally, some state provisions clearly fall outside the law's preemptive
scope. For example, Texas's HB 300 requires the state attorney general to
maintain a website that provides "information concerning a consumer's
privacy rights," and also requires training of state employees. 123 Since these
provisions do not concern data on the national network, they would likely
survive.
In the scenario I envisage, in the interests of political buy-in and
federalism, TEFCA would only narrowly preempt state privacy laws only to
the extent they touch on data transmitted on the national network, and would
otherwise leave the privacy laws intact. Further, ONC must be sure to involve
states in the process of writing the common agreement and emphasize that it
seeks to preempt state law only to the narrowest degree possible. As I argue
elsewhere, each QHIN should either be subject to or itself be transformed
into a public-private partnership. Indeed, the state of California made a
120

See Rachel Z. Arndt, New Platform Lets PatientsSell Their Health Data, MOD.

HEALTHCARE (Nov.

30, 2017),

https://www.modemhealthcare.com/article/20171130/NEWS/171139996 (discussing a new
mobile app through which patients can aggregate their own health records and, in effect,
circumvent the "cloud middleman" from accessing their data). To be sure, the preemption
would apply only to entities that choose to join the network; See generally Letter from Brian
Scarpelli, Senior Pol'y Counsel, Connected Health Initiative, to Don Rucker, Nat'l
Coordinator for Health Info. Tech., U.S. Dep't Health & Hum. Servs. 6 (Feb. 20, 2018) (on
file with author) (urging the ONC to maintain the "voluntary nature" of the TEFCA). While
the networks are voluntary, some commenters note that as a practical matter, it may not be,

id. The AMA and others note, for example, that insurers may require providers to link to the
TEFCA network, Comments on the Proposed Draft of the Trusted Exchange Framework and
Common Agreement, Am. Med. Ass'n 5 (Feb. 20, 2018) (on file with author); See Letter
from Brian Scarpelli, supra, at 6 (commenting on the Trusted Exchange Framework for the
Interoperable Exchange of Electronic Health Information). This still counts as voluntary
private behavior, however. These commenters, however, seek to prevent insurers from
having the power from making these demands. Creating a space of uniform regulation will
create-as the comments above suggest-an almost irresistible urge to join TEFCA.
121 CAL. CIV. CODE § 56.107(a)(5) (West 2014) (displaying deadlines as seven days

for electronic transmission or telephonic requests and fourteen days for requests
made by first-class mail); TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 181.102 (West
2015) (stating, with specific limitations, that the request shall be fulfilled not later
than fifteen business days after the request is made); 45 C.F.R. § 164.524 (2014)
(requiring the covered entity to comply within thirty days after receipt of a request).
122 DRAFT 2,
123

supra note 70, at 4.
TEx. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 181.103 (West 2015).
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similar suggestion. 124 State networks have already developed public-private
approaches that can be used as a model. 25 One simple approach would
simply engage private entities, including EHR companies, payers, providers,
and patient advocacy groups on the council, as well as representatives from
each state that the regional network covers. Indeed, as states have developed
expertise in the process of creating state networks, as well as expertise on
their own laws, they would be well situated to offer input on the preemption
incentive. As TEFCA contemplates, ONC can be appealed to in the case of
any dispute. 126 In this way, states will be engaged in the development of the
preemption incentive.
CONCLUSION

ONC has never been given much power as an agency. 127 In 2004, it was
created by Executive Order. 128 HITECH gave it only a limited set of
powers. 129 Cures is the first statute which has given it both authority and
power-even as the administration slashes its budget. 3 ' It therefore has had
to walk softly-with a small, rather than a big stick. It has to encourage
industry buy-in and create incentives that will produce engagement from
industry, rather than enforce its mandate through command and control
measures. The incentives in Cures regulation and guidance that offers
voluntary programs with incentives is of a piece with these practices. ONC
has successfully created a robust set of incentives in the context of
of Medical Information Act, CAL. CIv. CODE §§ 56-56.16
(West 2003) (outlining patients' rights to access their medical records, including restrictions
on unauthorized disclosure).
125 See TEFCA COMMENTS, supra note 76 (requiring certain number of council members to
be from private industry; see also Act No. 94-1 effective July 1, 1994 Conn. Acts 1343,
1350 (Spec. Sess.) https://heinonline.org/HOL/P?h=hein.ssl/ssctOO63&i=198 (establishing
an office of health care access in Connecticut and related departments). Connecticut's
approach is the most novel. The Connecticut entity was run by an executive director
appointed by the state agency based out of the University of Connecticut, id. at 1349-50. In
addition to the agency, however, the legislation mandated an advisory board comprised of
representatives from private groups. Id. at 1350. The government entity had the final say,
unless a majority of the private board objected, in which case the issue would be decided by
senior officials in the health agency. Id.
124 See generally Confidentiality

126 DRAFT

2, supra note 70, at 25.

127 See

Memorandum from Andrew L. Nolan, Leg. Attorney, & C. Stephen Redhead,
Specialist in Health Pol'y, to the House Committee on Energy and Commerce (Jan. 7, 2015)
(on file with the Congressional Research Service) (analyzing the scope of the current legal
authority for the ONC within the Department of Health and Human Services).
128 About ONC, HEALTHIT. Gov (last updated Feb. 14, 2019),
https://www.healthit.gov/topic/about-onc.
129 MEMORANDUM FROM ANDREW L. NOLAN, supra note 127, at 2.
130 See Kate Monica, What Provisions of the 21st Century CuresAct Has ONC
Implemented?, EHR INTELLIGENCE (December 12, 2018),
https://ehrintelligence.com/news/which-provisions-of-the-2 1st-century-cures-acthas-onc-implemented; see also LANDI, supra note 101.
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information blocking and interoperability at the micro-level.' 3 ' However, at
the macro-level, ONC has more carrots to offer than it has contemplated. In
this way, we may finally realize a fully national health information network.

"' See Interoperability and Patient Access for Medicare Advantage Organization and
Medicaid Managed Care Plans, State Medicaid Agencies, CHIP Agencies and CHIP
Managed Care Entities, Issuers of Qualified Health Plans in the Federally Facilitated
Exchanges and Health Care Providers, 84 Fed. Reg. 7610, 7645 (proposed Mar. 4, 2019) (to
be codified at 45 C.F.R. pt. 170).
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